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Abstract
In order to find out why energy-not-supplied in Norway - the most im-
portant indicator for the quality of service in the quality-regulation regime
there - decreased more pronounced before the introduction of quality-regulation
in 2001 than after it, we develop a dynamic quality-DEA-model and apply it
to a representative sample of distribution-net operators. Our model enables
us to calculate a counter-factual and thus to tentatively answer the question:
What would have happened, had there been no quality-regulation? This way
we find strong evidence that the quality-regulation in Norway did not have
an effect on the behavior of the firms.
Keywords: DEA, dynamic DEA, efficiency, quality regulation, Norway,
counter-factual
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1 INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
In the wake of major blackouts and plummeting customer satisfaction with
the quality of service in the liberalized electricity markets in Europe, it has
become a pressing question whether and in how far quality-regulation can
counter such developments.
When trying to answer this difficult question in a positive - instead of a nor-
mative - fashion, the focus of attention naturally shifts to Norway as it was
one the very first countries where quality of service was explicitly and rigor-
ously included in the regulatory regime. Specifically, the electricity suppli-
ers have to pay a penalty according to the expected cost that the undelivered
energy causes with the respective customers. This regime was introduced
in 2001, revised in 2003 and 2005 and led to the following development of
energy-not-supplied (ENS) in Norway:
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Figure 1: Development of ENS (MWh) in Norway
Source: Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) - http://www.nve.no
As can be seen, between 1999 (pre quality-regulation) and 2005 the
amount of ENS decreased by more than 50%. What can also be seen, how-
ever, is, that the average annual rate of reduction was much higher before
(1999-2001: -9.8%) than after the introduction of quality-regulation (2001-
2005: -6.27%).
As this development of ENS raises the question whether quality-regulation
actually made a difference, we develop a dynamic DEA-model that incor-
porates quality-regulation as an explicit constraint. This way we are able
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to calculate a counter-factual, i. e. we can tentatively answer the ques-
tion: What would have happened between 2001 and 2005, had there been
no quality-regulation.
In what follows, we first develop the model and explain its theoretic proper-
ties and then apply it to a representative sample of Norwegian distribution-
net providers. Finally we draw conclusions, as to why or why not quality-
regulation did in fact make a difference.
2 The Model
2.1 Background
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as pioneered by Charnes et al. (1979) is
a non-parametric method to estimate the efficiency of enterprises. Its pop-
ularity stems from the fact that it can specify an efficient frontier without
the need for the definition of a production function by laying a convex hull
around the empirically available input-output combinations of the players
in the sample. Following Farrell’s pioneering approach (Farrell, 1957), ef-
ficiency of the respective enterprise can then, for example, be measured by
the distance between the observation and the estimated ideal on the effi-
cient frontier. Mathematically this is accomplished by formulating for each
enterprise a linear program in which the objective function represents the
efficiency of the respective enterprise and the constraints stand for the re-
strictions of the production possibility set. This basic setting can and has
been modified in many different ways in order to better resemble the spe-
cific empirical situation. In this manner Fare and Logan (1992) have shown
what effects the explicit inclusion of the rate-of-return regulation (RoR) as a
constraint can have on the measured efficiency of the enterprises.
When trying to do the same with the regulation of quality the following as-
pects have to be considered:
First, the quality of electricity supply can to a great extend directly be at-
tributed to the level of so called “quasi-fixed” capital inputs, like transformer
stations and transmission cables/lines, that cannot be adjusted to their opti-
mal levels instantaneously such that decisions about their level in one period
have important implications not only for the efficiency in that period but also
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for that of subsequent ones. In other words: The characteristics of the provi-
sion of quality call for a dynamic perspective that captures the intertemporal
aspects of investment in quasi-fixed inputs more accurately than the con-
ventional static view. Amongst the first ones to realize this necessity were
Nemoto and Goto and they thus augmented conventional DEA by treating
quasi-fixed inputs at the end of one period as if they were outputs in that
period and essential inputs in the subsequent one (Nemoto and Goto, 1999).
In this setting the firm faces installation costs: the more resources are con-
sumed in installing quasi-fixed inputs, the less there are left over for produc-
ing outputs1. On the other hand, more quasi-fixed inputs in the next period
mean greater production possibilities and therefore profits in that and sub-
sequent periods. This is the basic trade-off the firm faces: Either maximize
output myopically in this period or invest in quasi-fixed inputs to increase
output in subsequent ones. To sum up: Measures for quality (like ENS)
should be treated like quasi-fixed inputs in Nemoto and Goto’s framework
when incorporating it in the DEA-framework.
This finding directly leads us to the second important point, that has to
be considered when adapting the DEA-framework for quality, namely that,
when taking a measure like ENS to represent the level of quality, we can-
not directly use it as a “normal” quasi-fixed input as Nemoto and Goto have
done since it has the characteristics of an “undesirable” output. Several ap-
proaches on how to amend DEA for such a situation have been suggested.
Dyckhoff and Allen (2001) for example mention Knox et al. (1995) who
take the reciprocals of the undesirable outputs and treat them as normal
outputs. Instead of taking the reciprocal, undesirable outputs can also be
transformed by a translation (for example by multiplying them with -1) (c.f.
Dyckhoff and Allen, 2001, p. 314). Fare et al. (1996) use the “weak dis-
posability assumption” to model the undesirable output, i. e. they assume
that reducing the undesirable output requires increased quantities of inputs
or decreased quantities of desirable outputs. Courcelle et al. (1998), on the
other hand, assess the economic and environmental performance of munic-
1Nemoto and Goto were also able to relate their approach seamlessly to the adjustment-cost
theory of investment, so that it provides a non-parametric alternative to the econometric Euler
equation approach (Nemoto and Goto, 2003, Appendix).
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ipal waste collection and sorting programs by defining the undesired output
as the ratio between the amount of material sent to final disposal and the to-
tal amount of material leaving the processing plant. This so-called “residue
ratio” is then treated like a normal input in DEA (c.f. Dyckhoff and Allen,
2001, p. 314). Korhonen and Luptacik (2004) show that these approaches
have nearly identical mathematical properties so that practical considera-
tions should lead the way when deciding on which one to choose.
We therefore choose Knox et al.’s approach, as it allows for an easy and in-
tuitive integration of a measure of quality as an undesired quasi-fixed input
in the concept of dynamic DEA.
How this is accomplished shall be shown in the following section.
2.2 Formulation
2.2.1 The production possibility set2
Let xt denote a l × 1 vector of variable inputs used in the period t, kt a
m× 1 vector of quasi-fixed inputs at the end of period t , and yt a n× 1
vector of outputs produced in period t. The firm (or “decision making unit”
- DMU) puts xt and kt−1 into the production process Pt in order to supply
yt to the market and to hold kt at the end of that period. This basic setting
shall be illustrated by figure 2. All combinations of (xt ,kt−1) ∈ R+l+m and
Figure 2: The technology of dynamic DEA
(kt ,yt) ∈R+l+m, where the latter is producible from the former, constitute the
2The mathematical description of the production possibility set is taken from Nemoto and Goto
(2003)
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production possibility set in period t:
Φt = {(xt ,kt−1,kt ,yt) ∈ Rl+m×Rm+n|(xt ,kt−1)can yield(kt ,yt)} (1)
It is required that Φt satisfies the regularity conditions:
(i) if (x˜t , ˜kt−1,kt ,yt) ∈ Φt and (x˜t , ˜kt−1) ≤ (kt ,yt), then (xt ,kt−1,kt ,yt) ∈
Φt ;
(ii) if (xt ,kt−1, ˜kt , y˜t) ∈ Φt and (x˜t , ˜kt−1) ≥ (kt ,yt), then (xt ,kt−1,kt ,yt) ∈
Φt ;
(iii) Φt is closed and convex
If the production technology is constant returns to scale, Φt becomes a con-
vex cone:
(iv) if (xt ,kt−1,kt ,yt) ∈ Φt , then (cxt ,ckt−1,kt ,yt) ∈ Φt for any c > 0.
As we are ultimately interested in empirical results we want to find a
more accurate description of Φt that satisfies the above conditions than what
a mere arbitrary guess of a production function a´ la Cobb-Douglas can yield.
DEA provides a solution to this problem by constructing a polyhedral con-
vex hull enveloping (hence the name) the observed data:
Suppose we have N observations, i. e. firms, with variable inputs Xt =
(xt1,xt2, . . . ,xtN) (each xti represents the input-vector of a firm), quasi-fixed
inputs Kt−1 = (kt−11,kt−12, . . . ,kt−1N) at the beginning of period t and quasi-
fixed inputs Kt = (kt1,kt2, . . . ,ktN) at the end of period t.
Assuming variable returns to scale, the smallest set comprising these obser-
vations and satisfying (i)-(iv) takes the form:
ˆΦt ={(xt ,kt−1,kt ,yt) ∈ Rl+m+ ×Rm+n+ |Xtλt ≤ Xt ,
Kt−1λt ≤ kt−1,Ktλt ≥ kt ,Ytλt ≥ yt , i′λt = 1,λt ≥ 0}
(2)
where λt is a N × 1 intensity vector whose j-th element is denoted by λt j
and i is a N×1 vector of ones.
2.2.2 Technical efficiency - the additive model
Technical efficiency in the DEA-context can be defined in several ways.
In the original formulation of Charnes et al. (1979), referred to as CCR-
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model, it was defined either as to what extend the inputs of each DMU could
be reduced proportionally while remaining on the same isoquant (input-
orientation) or as by how much the outputs could be increased proportionally
while holding inputs constant (output-orientation). In our dynamic context
this leads to problems as the quasi-fixed inputs have the character of outputs
in period t and that of inputs in period t + 1 and therefore, when trying to
determine the technical efficiency of a DMU, both an input- and an output-
orientation is required. The so-called additive model circumvents the above
problem by combining both orientations. Here efficiency is somewhat de-
fined the other way round: For each DMU, the maximal sum of all slacks,
i. e. the distances to the efficient frontier in all inputs and outputs, is deter-
mined. A DMU is efficient, only if this sum is zero. Figure 3 is supposed to
illustrate the differences of the 2 concepts.
Figure 3: The CCR- (left) and the Additive model (right)
2.2.3 The intertemporal LP-problem3
Taking up the efficiency-concept from the additive model leads to the follow-
ing intertemporal optimization problem: Maximize the sum of the slacks of
all factors over the entire time-horizon subject to the restrictions of the pro-
duction possibility frontier as given by (2).
3LP. . . linear programming
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This problem is equivalent to the following linear program:
max
n
Sk0 ,Syt ,Sxt ,S
+
kt ,kt ,S
−
kt ,λt
oT
t=1
γSk0+
T∑
t=1
γ t (Sxt +Syt
+dS+kt S
+
kt +dS−kt S
−
kt
)
s.t. kt−1−Kt−1λt −Skt−1 = 0 t = 1
kt−1−Ktλt −S−kt = 0 t = 2, . . . ,T
xt −Xtλt −Sxt = 0 t = 1,2, . . . ,T
Ytλt −Syt − yt = 0 t = 1,2, . . . ,T
Ktλt −S+kt − kt = 0 t = 1,2, . . . ,T −1
i′λt = 1 t = 1,2, . . . ,T
Sk0 ,Syt ,Sxt ,S
+
kt ,kt ,S
−
kt ,λt ≥ 0 t = 1,2, . . . ,T
dS+kt ,dS−kt ∈ {0,1} t = 1,2, . . . ,T
(3)
where k0 is the initial exogenous value of quasi-fixed inputs, γ is a dis-
count factor and dS+kt and dS−kt are dummy-variables whose value is either 0
or 14. The program determines for each DMU the maximal slack-value for
each input and output category for every point in time.
The intertemporal aspect in this program is represented by the constraints 2
and 5: The program tries to find the combination of S+kt ,S
−
kt and kt for each
period that maximizes the total slack. In other words: Whereas the values of
the variable inputs of each period are the exogenously given (but controllable
by the firm) observed data, only the initial value for the quasi-fixed input is
given exogenously and the subsequent optimal values are determined in the
process of the optimization. This is where the basic trade-off of the firm is
manifested: On the one hand it wants to close its gap to the efficient fron-
tier concerning the outputs and thus also increase its amount of quasi-fixed
inputs in period t but on the other hand such an increased amount of quasi-
fixed inputs reduces its efficiency concerning the inputs in period t +1. This
dilemma shall be illustrated by figure 4.
4These dummy-variables are necessary for modeling the regulation of quality as will be ex-
plained in section 2.2.4.
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Figure 4: The trade-off between output improvement and input-efficiency deteri-
oration
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2.2.4 Modeling the regulation of quality
As already mentioned above, quality enters into our model as an undesired
quasi-fixed inputs in the form of ENS. That means that the exact nature of the
above described decision-problem of the firm depends on whether quality is
regulated or not:
No regulation of quality In this case, the firm maximizes its regular
output and minimizes its variable inputs but doesn’t care about the ensuing
level of the quasi-fixed input. In the context of the LP-problem (3) this
means that the program has to ignore the slack of the quasi-fixed input S−kt
in period t + 1 but should seek to maximize its slack S+kt in period t
5
. This
behavior can be achieved by setting dS+kt to 1 and dS−kt to 0 in the periods
without regulation of quality.
Remark. It is a big merit of the inter-temporal formulation that it naturally
sets a lower non-zero bound for k∗t , the optimal level of kt in t and t + 1, so
that the potential problem of obtaining a zero as the optimal value, when the
undesired output enters as its reciprocal, is automatically alleviated. This is
shown in the appendix.
With regulation of quality When quality is regulated like in Norway,
such that there is a penalty for every MWh of energy-not-supplied, the firm
will adapt its objective such that not only its regular outputs are maximized
and its variable inputs are minimized but also such that its quasi-fixed in-
puts are minimized. In the context of the LP-problem (3) this means that the
program has to ignore the slack of the quasi-fixed input S+kt in period t but
should seek to maximize its slack S−kt in period t + 1. This behavior can be
achieved by setting dS+kt to 0 and dS−kt to 1 in the periods with regulation of
quality.
To sum up: By setting the dummies in the objective function appropriately,
we can simulate the decision problem of the firm for the case of regulation
5Remember: The quasi-fixed input enters as its reciprocal in the LP-problem so that for exam-
ple a bigger slack in t (i. e. a value closer to 0) means a bigger actual value of the variable.
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and non-regulation of quality. Since the model then determines the respec-
tive ensuing optimal level of quality for the firm, we can calculate the re-
spective optimal paths of quality and thus a counter-factual that will enable
us to draw conclusions as to what difference the regulation in reality has
made.
3 The Data
The dataset originally consisted of the fifty largest Norwegian electricity dis-
tribution firms as published by the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy
Directorate (NVE). After eliminating units with insufficient data quality the
model was finally applied to 29 DMUs (decision making units) in the years
1999-2005. Input- and output-factors were chosen for the following reasons:
Variable inputs As the sole variable input, total expenditures (TOTEX),
which consist of operating expenditures (OPEX) and capital expenditures
(CAPEX), were chosen. In our case, OPEX comprised the costs for network
losses, wages and other costs. Following Korhonen and Syrja¨nen (2003),
costs for transmission services were not included in the OPEX, as they are
beyond the control of a single unit. Our capital expenditures (CAPEX)
consisted of depreciation plus the value of the assets multiplied with the
so called fair rate of return. The fair rate of return is set by the regulator
and serves as a reasonable approximation of the actual financing costs of a
firm. According to Grasto (1997) and Kinnunen (2003) the fair rate of return
which is used in Norway is the return of a medium term government bond
(risk free rate) plus a two percent risk premium, where debt and equity are
treated equally. Having a figure for annual capital expenditures allows us to
compute total expenditures (TOTEX) by adding OPEX and CAPEX.
Quasi-fixed Inputs As already indicated above, energy-not-supplied (ENS)
which measures the amount of energy (in MWh) that could not be delivered
due to failures of the distribution system was used as the sole quasi-fixed in-
put. To be more precise, ENS measures how much energy customers would
have used, if there had been no failure by considering the typical load curve
of customers at the time of the outage.
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Outputs Two outputs were chosen to account for the most important di-
mensions: The amount of energy delivered over the network (MWh) and the
number of customers.
4 Results6
Figure 5 shows the actual development of the sum of ENS for our sam-
ple. As can be seen, the picture is more or less the same as with the whole
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Figure 5: Development of the sum of ENS of the sample
of Norway (c. f. figure 1), albeit more drastic: Here too, it is striking,
that the reduction in ENS was much more pronounced before the intro-
duction of quality regulation in 2001 than after it. From the very different
courses of the upper dotted (meanact. data + st. devact. data) and lower dotted
lines (meanact. data − st. devact. data) in figure 6 we infer that the regulation
affected enterprises with relatively high ENS differently than those with rel-
atively low ENS and conjecture the following:
6The calculations were all done in R with the package “LP-solve” and a discount factor γ of( 1
1+0.06
)
.
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Figure 6: Development of the sample mean± standard deviation of the actual
ENS
Conjecture 1. In the whole time-span the “upper fraction” (UF)7 acted as
if no regulation had been in place.
Conjecture 2. The “lower fraction” (LF)8 acted as if quality had been reg-
ulated in the whole time-span.
We utilize our two versions of the model - regulated and non-regulated -
to test the above hypotheses. To be more precise: In the unregulated model,
quality is not subject to regulation at any point, this is modeled as described
in section 2.2.4. In the regulated model, quality is not regulated from 1999
until 2000 but subject to regulation from 2001 until 2005. In other words, the
regulated model simulates “reality” whereas the unregulated model stands
for the counter-factual.
Figure 7 shows the UF and the LF of the calculated optimal paths of the
respective models together with the UF and LF of the actual values of ENS.
Apparently, the optimal paths of the 2 models are identical from 1998 until
7Henceforth we will call mean+ st.dev “upper fraction” (of the sample).
8Henceforth we will call mean− st.dev “lower fraction” (of the sample).
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2000 - this is the logical result of the identical model specification in this
time-span. From 2001 on, however, the 2 paths diverge significantly.
From 1999 until 2000 both models’ prediction for the UF is very similar to
the UF of actual values. From 2000 onwards, however, the gap between the
regulated UF and the actual UF steadily increases whereas the UF of the
unregulated model fluctuates around the actual UF. Therefore, we can con-
clude that, if at all, the unregulated model predicts the actual UF better than
the regulated model, which supports our conjecture 1.
Conjecture 2 is supported by the fact that the unregulated LF fluctuates rather
erratically around the actual LF in the whole time-span whereas not only the
shape of regulated LF looks very similar to the actual LF but also both - the
regulated LF and the regulated UF - seem to converge towards the actual LF.
To sum up: For our sample, the regulation of quality in Norway did not
have a significant effect on the amount of ENS:
Neither did it induce those firms with relatively high ENS to change their
behavior, nor those with relatively low ENS.
5 Conclusion
Our investigation was led by the quest to find answers as to why ENS - the
most important indicator for the quality of service in the quality-regulation
regime in Norway - declined much more pronounced before the introduction
of quality-regulation in 2001 than after it. In order to answer this difficult
question we first developed a dynamic DEA-model in which ENS enters as
a “quasi-fixed” input. This way the short run fixity of the level of quality
and the thus inter-temporal aspects of investment-decisions could be treated
more adequately than in traditional static DEA-models. Moreover, it enabled
us, by manipulating the objective function, to explicitly model the incorpo-
ration or absence of quality in a regulatory regime.
Equipped with this model we looked at the data of 29 electricity distribution
operators. This sample showed broadly the same characteristics as the whole
of Norway: Apparently those operators with relatively high ENS, reduced
ENS significantly before 2001 but then they followed a flat path. On the
other hand, those operators with relatively low ENS showed low reduction
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rates the whole time. Inferring from this observation, we conjectured first,
that the firms with relatively high ENS acted as if regulation had been absent
in the whole time-span and second, that the firms with relatively low ENS
acted as if regulation had been present in the whole time-span.
Utilizing our dynamic quality-DEA-model in a regulated and a unregu-
lated version in order to calculate the optimal respective ENS-paths we could
find strong support for the above conjectures and we can therefore conclude
that, at least for our sample, the regulation of quality in Norway did not have
a significant effect.
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A Appendix
Lemma. The solution for the undesired output when entered as its recipro-
cal is non-zero in the dynamic DEA-Model with variable returns to scale.
Proof. The constraints 2 and 5 in (3) determine the value of kt . Adding
constraint 2 of period t +1 to constraint 5 of period t eliminates kt and yields
the following expression:
Ktλt −S+kt︸ ︷︷ ︸
kt
−Ktλt −S−kt︸ ︷︷ ︸
−kt
= 0
Suppose, now, that kt is zero. That means that the right part of the above
expression must be zero too. Since S−kt is positive by assumption, therefore
Ktλt either has to be zero or negative which both contradicts our assumption
of variable return to scale as represented by constraint 6.
